Berliner Boersenzeitung - Iran's collapse fuels Revolt

EUR -
AED 4.343054
AFN 77.464136
ALL 96.578481
AMD 443.001294
ANG 2.116924
AOA 1084.432259
ARS 1696.425045
AUD 1.722632
AWG 2.13043
AZN 2.015092
BAM 1.955364
BBD 2.363473
BDT 143.548016
BGN 1.986001
BHD 0.442401
BIF 3475.425631
BMD 1.182587
BND 1.500966
BOB 8.109193
BRL 6.256361
BSD 1.173439
BTN 107.717999
BWP 16.277373
BYN 3.32206
BYR 23178.695489
BZD 2.360074
CAD 1.622687
CDF 2578.039008
CHF 0.922409
CLF 0.026073
CLP 1029.489324
CNY 8.24689
CNH 8.21806
COP 4228.657801
CRC 580.770597
CUC 1.182587
CUP 31.338542
CVE 110.240437
CZK 24.267271
DJF 208.973438
DKK 7.466899
DOP 73.933527
DZD 153.154875
EGP 55.703589
ERN 17.738798
ETB 182.791072
FJD 2.661179
FKP 0.870315
GBP 0.866681
GEL 3.18162
GGP 0.870315
GHS 12.79115
GIP 0.870315
GMD 86.329235
GNF 10278.709772
GTQ 9.006993
GYD 245.515296
HKD 9.221278
HNL 30.954103
HRK 7.533317
HTG 153.905708
HUF 382.153287
IDR 19840.785951
ILS 3.707232
IMP 0.870315
INR 108.316693
IQD 1537.357457
IRR 49816.456691
ISK 145.777895
JEP 0.870315
JMD 184.718842
JOD 0.838501
JPY 184.146504
KES 151.256298
KGS 103.416722
KHR 4722.947667
KMF 496.686746
KPW 1064.353704
KRW 1710.387141
KWD 0.362349
KYD 0.977982
KZT 590.738376
LAK 25359.349612
LBP 105085.885516
LKR 363.548997
LRD 217.091629
LSL 18.94048
LTL 3.491871
LVL 0.715335
LYD 7.466336
MAD 10.748905
MDL 19.97255
MGA 5308.817127
MKD 61.616271
MMK 2483.187819
MNT 4218.830116
MOP 9.4253
MRU 46.916546
MUR 54.292994
MVR 18.271409
MWK 2034.84661
MXN 20.533372
MYR 4.736855
MZN 75.57955
NAD 18.94048
NGN 1680.526824
NIO 43.180379
NOK 11.555294
NPR 172.348599
NZD 1.987207
OMR 0.454249
PAB 1.173539
PEN 3.936823
PGK 5.018882
PHP 69.733624
PKR 328.342141
PLN 4.208885
PYG 7847.251532
QAR 4.278347
RON 5.101724
RSD 117.373848
RUB 89.207823
RWF 1711.518652
SAR 4.433442
SBD 9.606873
SCR 16.856244
SDG 711.330129
SEK 10.584272
SGD 1.505082
SHP 0.887246
SLE 28.859447
SLL 24798.24684
SOS 669.450838
SRD 45.081425
STD 24477.153012
STN 24.494542
SVC 10.267712
SYP 13078.904017
SZL 18.935781
THB 36.920787
TJS 10.972155
TMT 4.139053
TND 3.416239
TOP 2.847384
TRY 51.246799
TTD 7.971224
TWD 37.116428
TZS 3004.130641
UAH 50.599026
UGX 4148.075755
USD 1.182587
UYU 44.440098
UZS 14242.826515
VES 416.584326
VND 31036.982812
VUV 141.661813
WST 3.258757
XAF 655.810877
XAG 0.011483
XAU 0.000237
XCD 3.196
XCG 2.114929
XDR 0.815618
XOF 655.810877
XPF 119.331742
YER 281.814608
ZAR 19.0597
ZMK 10644.701884
ZMW 23.02187
ZWL 380.792372
  • SCS

    0.0200

    16.14

    +0.12%

  • RBGPF

    -0.8100

    83.23

    -0.97%

  • CMSD

    0.0900

    24.13

    +0.37%

  • GSK

    0.5000

    49.15

    +1.02%

  • NGG

    1.3200

    81.5

    +1.62%

  • BTI

    0.9400

    59.16

    +1.59%

  • BP

    1.1000

    36.53

    +3.01%

  • CMSC

    0.1000

    23.75

    +0.42%

  • RELX

    0.0600

    39.9

    +0.15%

  • RIO

    3.1300

    90.43

    +3.46%

  • BCE

    0.4900

    25.2

    +1.94%

  • JRI

    0.0100

    13.68

    +0.07%

  • BCC

    -1.1800

    84.33

    -1.4%

  • AZN

    1.2600

    92.95

    +1.36%

  • RYCEF

    0.3000

    17.12

    +1.75%

  • VOD

    0.2300

    14.17

    +1.62%


Iran's collapse fuels Revolt




Over the past year the Iranian economy has slid into its most severe crisis since the 1979 revolution. The national currency, the rial, has lost nearly half of its value against the United States dollar in the space of a year, with exchange rates in the open market climbing from around 817,000 rials per dollar at the start of 2025 to well over 1.4 million by the end of December. In parallel, inflation has remained above 40 per cent for several consecutive years, and the cost of staple foods has skyrocketed – bread and grains have almost doubled in price and fruit has climbed by more than 70 per cent in the past twelve months. Years of international sanctions, particularly on oil exports, have eroded government revenues and restricted access to hard currency. A multi‑tier exchange system has allowed importers linked to the political elite to buy dollars at preferential rates, reinforcing perceptions of deep economic injustice. 

These structural weaknesses have been exacerbated by external shocks. A twelve‑day war with Israel in mid‑2025 damaged infrastructure across several cities and caused further economic disruption. In September 2025 the United Nations re‑imposed sanctions linked to Iran’s nuclear programme, and a new tier in the national fuel subsidy system introduced in December raised petrol prices for many households. The cumulative effect has been a sharp decline in purchasing power for ordinary Iranians and a contraction in gross domestic product that is forecast to continue through 2026. 

Protests ignite across the country
The acute deterioration in living standards reached a tipping point on 28 December 2025. Merchants and shopkeepers in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar closed their premises in protest at soaring prices and the collapsing currency. Their grievances quickly resonated with a wider cross‑section of society. Within days, demonstrations had spread to the provinces and to university campuses. Students, workers, oil sector employees and lorry drivers joined the strikes, turning an economic protest into a nationwide movement challenging the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. 

Protesters chanted slogans that harked back to Iran’s monarchical past and openly called for the resignation of key figures in the Islamic government. They denounced corruption and the dominance of the Revolutionary Guard Corps in sectors ranging from oil to construction. Anxiety about price volatility – the inability of merchants to set stable prices for imported goods – was as potent a driver as the level of inflation itself. The convergence of bazaaris, students and industrial workers signalled a new and dangerous alliance for the regime, recalling historical moments when alliances between merchants and clerics had toppled previous governments. 

Government response and growing casualties
Faced with the largest challenge to its authority in years, the government of President Masoud Pezeshkian acknowledged that the crisis was self‑inflicted and promised to listen to “legitimate demands”. The central bank governor was dismissed and a monthly food coupon system was introduced to cushion the poorest households, while officials talked of institutional reforms and new subsidies to support essential goods. At the same time, security forces moved swiftly to suppress the unrest. Police and Revolutionary Guard units deployed tear gas, batons and, in some cases, live ammunition. Internet access was throttled across the country, leaving citizens cut off from one another and from the outside world.

Rights organisations estimate that thousands of protesters and members of the security forces have been killed since late December. Tens of thousands have been arrested. The authorities have not issued official casualty figures but concede that many security personnel have died. Footage circulating on social media shows large crowds chanting in support of the exiled Pahlavi heir, burning portraits of the Supreme Leader and attacking symbols of the state. 

International implications and the path ahead
The turmoil has reverberated far beyond Iran’s borders. Diplomatic missions were briefly shut, and governments in Europe and North America summoned Iranian ambassadors to protest at the crackdown. The United States, which reimposed unilateral sanctions in 2018 and was involved in recent military strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities, has warned that further violence against demonstrators could trigger intervention. Calls for the Iranian government to respect fundamental freedoms have come from allied governments and international organisations. 

Internally, the protests reveal deep structural tensions within the Islamic Republic. The concentration of economic power in the Revolutionary Guard Corps has deprived elected officials of the means to manage the economy, while corruption and opaque networks of patronage have alienated the bazaar merchants who once underpinned the system. A prolonged drought, air pollution and energy shortages have further undermined the regime’s legitimacy. 

Whether this wave of unrest will bring about immediate political change remains uncertain. Iran has witnessed large‑scale protests in 2009, 2017, 2019 and 2022, all of which were eventually suppressed. The current movement is remarkable for its geographic reach – demonstrations have been reported in all 31 provinces – and for the diversity of participants. However, opposition factions remain fragmented, and there is as yet no universally recognised figurehead capable of unifying the disparate groups. The security apparatus remains loyal to the Supreme Leader, and there are few signs of internal splits that could precipitate a rapid collapse of the regime.

Nevertheless, the economic crisis shows no sign of abating. With oil revenues constrained, inflation entrenched and the currency in freefall, the government’s tools for stabilisation are limited. Many Iranians believe that nothing short of a fundamental transformation of the political system will end decades of hardship. The protests of late 2025 and early 2026 may therefore mark the beginning of a new chapter in Iran’s modern history – a turning point where economic desperation accelerates the decline of a revolutionary regime that has dominated the country for almost half a century.