Berliner Boersenzeitung - Cuba’s bleak oil crisis

EUR -
AED 4.343054
AFN 77.464136
ALL 96.578481
AMD 443.001294
ANG 2.116924
AOA 1084.432259
ARS 1696.425045
AUD 1.722632
AWG 2.13043
AZN 2.015092
BAM 1.955364
BBD 2.363473
BDT 143.548016
BGN 1.986001
BHD 0.442401
BIF 3475.425631
BMD 1.182587
BND 1.500966
BOB 8.109193
BRL 6.256361
BSD 1.173439
BTN 107.717999
BWP 16.277373
BYN 3.32206
BYR 23178.695489
BZD 2.360074
CAD 1.622687
CDF 2578.039008
CHF 0.922409
CLF 0.026073
CLP 1029.489324
CNY 8.24689
CNH 8.21806
COP 4228.657801
CRC 580.770597
CUC 1.182587
CUP 31.338542
CVE 110.240437
CZK 24.267271
DJF 208.973438
DKK 7.466899
DOP 73.933527
DZD 153.154875
EGP 55.703589
ERN 17.738798
ETB 182.791072
FJD 2.661179
FKP 0.870315
GBP 0.866681
GEL 3.18162
GGP 0.870315
GHS 12.79115
GIP 0.870315
GMD 86.329235
GNF 10278.709772
GTQ 9.006993
GYD 245.515296
HKD 9.221278
HNL 30.954103
HRK 7.533317
HTG 153.905708
HUF 382.153287
IDR 19840.785951
ILS 3.707232
IMP 0.870315
INR 108.316693
IQD 1537.357457
IRR 49816.456691
ISK 145.777895
JEP 0.870315
JMD 184.718842
JOD 0.838501
JPY 184.146504
KES 151.256298
KGS 103.416722
KHR 4722.947667
KMF 496.686746
KPW 1064.353704
KRW 1710.387141
KWD 0.362349
KYD 0.977982
KZT 590.738376
LAK 25359.349612
LBP 105085.885516
LKR 363.548997
LRD 217.091629
LSL 18.94048
LTL 3.491871
LVL 0.715335
LYD 7.466336
MAD 10.748905
MDL 19.97255
MGA 5308.817127
MKD 61.616271
MMK 2483.187819
MNT 4218.830116
MOP 9.4253
MRU 46.916546
MUR 54.292994
MVR 18.271409
MWK 2034.84661
MXN 20.533372
MYR 4.736855
MZN 75.57955
NAD 18.94048
NGN 1680.526824
NIO 43.180379
NOK 11.555294
NPR 172.348599
NZD 1.987207
OMR 0.454249
PAB 1.173539
PEN 3.936823
PGK 5.018882
PHP 69.733624
PKR 328.342141
PLN 4.208885
PYG 7847.251532
QAR 4.278347
RON 5.101724
RSD 117.373848
RUB 89.207823
RWF 1711.518652
SAR 4.433442
SBD 9.606873
SCR 16.856244
SDG 711.330129
SEK 10.584272
SGD 1.505082
SHP 0.887246
SLE 28.859447
SLL 24798.24684
SOS 669.450838
SRD 45.081425
STD 24477.153012
STN 24.494542
SVC 10.267712
SYP 13078.904017
SZL 18.935781
THB 36.920787
TJS 10.972155
TMT 4.139053
TND 3.416239
TOP 2.847384
TRY 51.246799
TTD 7.971224
TWD 37.116428
TZS 3004.130641
UAH 50.599026
UGX 4148.075755
USD 1.182587
UYU 44.440098
UZS 14242.826515
VES 416.584326
VND 31036.982812
VUV 141.661813
WST 3.258757
XAF 655.810877
XAG 0.011483
XAU 0.000237
XCD 3.196
XCG 2.114929
XDR 0.815618
XOF 655.810877
XPF 119.331742
YER 281.814608
ZAR 19.0597
ZMK 10644.701884
ZMW 23.02187
ZWL 380.792372
  • RIO

    3.1300

    90.43

    +3.46%

  • SCS

    0.0200

    16.14

    +0.12%

  • BTI

    0.9400

    59.16

    +1.59%

  • CMSC

    0.1000

    23.75

    +0.42%

  • JRI

    0.0100

    13.68

    +0.07%

  • RBGPF

    -0.8100

    83.23

    -0.97%

  • CMSD

    0.0900

    24.13

    +0.37%

  • BCE

    0.4900

    25.2

    +1.94%

  • BCC

    -1.1800

    84.33

    -1.4%

  • BP

    1.1000

    36.53

    +3.01%

  • GSK

    0.5000

    49.15

    +1.02%

  • NGG

    1.3200

    81.5

    +1.62%

  • RELX

    0.0600

    39.9

    +0.15%

  • VOD

    0.2300

    14.17

    +1.62%

  • RYCEF

    0.3000

    17.12

    +1.75%

  • AZN

    1.2600

    92.95

    +1.36%


Cuba’s bleak oil crisis




The arrest of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro in early January 2026, and the subsequent pledge by Washington to reroute Venezuela’s oil away from its Caribbean ally, has jolted Havana into a new economic crisis. Cuba’s lifeline to cheap Venezuelan crude has shrivelled; the last tanker from the state oil company PDVSA left Venezuela’s José port in mid‑December and arrived in Havana with its transponder off, carrying about 600,000 barrels. In 2025 Venezuela supplied roughly 26,500 barrels per day, a third of Cuba’s daily needs, while Mexico contributed about 5,000 barrels. After Maduro’s capture, Venezuelan fuel deliveries stopped altogether and U.S. officials declared a virtual blockade on Caracas’ tankers, leaving Cuba with insufficient oil reserves and only modest shipments from Mexico. Energy analyst Jorge Piñón of the University of Texas warned that there is “no light at the end of the tunnel” for Cuba to survive the next few months without Venezuelan oil.

An energy grid in freefall
Cuba’s antiquated, oil‑fired power grid has lurched from crisis to crisis in recent years. A nationwide grid collapse in March 2025 plunged millions into darkness after a transmission line shorted near Havana, forcing a restart of the entire system and leaving both of the island’s main power stations idle. The collapse followed months of rolling blackouts outside the capital that peaked at 20 hours a day, with entire rural areas losing electricity for longer than they had power. Residents resorted to charcoal fires for cooking and scrambled to obtain ice to keep food cold. Cuba’s top electricity official warned that repairs would be slow, while shortages of fuel, medicine, water and food made life “unbearable”.

Blackouts have triggered social unrest. In March 2024, crowds in Santiago de Cuba banged pots and demanded “power and food” when the lights went out at a state‑run market. Residents interviewed by reporters spoke of electricity outages exceeding 10 hours a day. Energy minister Vicente de la O’Levy publicly acknowledged that shortages of power “provide the spark for any protest”. In November 2024, the government warned that it would not tolerate “public disorder” as scattered demonstrations erupted following another nationwide blackout caused by Hurricane Rafael; prosecutors announced the preventive detention of protesters on charges of assault and vandalism. The state responded by distributing emergency rations and accelerating repairs, but rolling blackouts continue across the country.

Blackouts and sanctions squeeze the economy
Cuba’s economy was already contracting before the current crisis. The pandemic and the near‑total shutdown of tourism caused a 10.9% drop in GDP in 2020, according to international statistics. Minor growth in 2021 and 2022 (1.3% and 1.8%) gave way to a return to recession in 2023–24. The United Nations forecasts a 1.5% decline for 2025, leaving Cuba and Haiti as the only Latin American economies still shrinking. Official statistics show that 11 of the country’s 15 economic sectors are contracting: sugar output is down 68%, fishing 53% and agriculture 52%, while manufacturing has fallen 41%. Export earnings fell by $900 million in 2024 and imports were 18% below forecast. Cuban economists estimate that the economy shrank about 4% in 2024, on top of a 1.9% contraction in 2023.

Blackouts amplify these losses. Economists inside Cuba say that the power crisis has paralysed industry and curtailed transport. Households lose refrigeration; water pumps and medical facilities falter; and businesses without generators lose productive hours. In many provinces, blackouts of 20 hours a day have become routine. A human‑rights blog citing utility reports noted generation shortfalls of 1,300 to 1,700 megawatts, meaning that nearly half of national demand went unmet during peak periods.

The collapse of Venezuelan oil supplies will aggravate this deficit. Cuba produces less than half of the electricity it needs and already imports most of its fuel. PDVSA shipments under the long‑standing “oil for doctors” programme once kept Cuba’s thermoelectric plants running; without them, generation capacity is set to plunge. No other ally is stepping in: energy researcher Piñón notes that Angola, Algeria, Brazil and even Russia have not offered significant support. Mexico’s occasional cargoes of 85,000 barrels are insufficient to “keep the lights on across the island”.

Political strain and regime anxiety
The political ramifications are severe. U.S. President Donald Trump has portrayed the seizure of Maduro as part of a broader crackdown on Latin American regimes. During a January 4 press conference, he said that “Cuba looks like it’s ready to fall”, declaring that the island’s government had no income now that Venezuelan oil was cut off. He threatened further military action against Caracas if the remaining officials did not cooperate, and suggested that Colombia and Mexico could also be targets. Trump’s comments have fuelled speculation about regime change, and have unsettled Cuba’s leadership.

U.S. intelligence reports acknowledge the island’s grim economic state but are ambivalent about whether hardship will topple the government. Confidential assessments described key sectors like agriculture and tourism as “severely strained” by frequent blackouts and trade sanctions. Analysts warned that the loss of oil imports from Venezuela could make governing more difficult. One official said that blackouts outside Havana were lasting an average of 20 hours a day. Yet the assessments concluded that economic suffering does not necessarily translate into regime collapse.

Cuban leaders nevertheless display signs of alarm. President Miguel Díaz‑Canel vowed that “nobody tells us what to do” and pledged to defend the homeland “until the last drop of blood”. The prosecutor’s office warned that it would not tolerate disorder during the blackouts and detained protesters for “assault, public disorder and vandalism”. Energy minister Vicente de la O’Levy admitted that power cuts fuel social tensions. Local officials have rushed to deliver subsidised food to calm restive communities in Santiago and other provinces. Behind the scenes, the government is quietly reassigning fuel supplies, rationing diesel for hospitals and planning emergency imports of floating power plants.

A humanitarian and demographic crisis
The economic implosion is driving an unprecedented exodus. Independent demographers estimate that Cuba’s population has fallen 25% in four years, dropping below nine million as hundreds of thousands migrate annually. A U.S. intelligence official cited by the press suggested that the population is likely under nine million. The loss of younger people erodes the labour force and saps the regime’s support base; an emeritus professor, Richard Feinberg, warns that when people are “really hungry,” they focus on survival rather than politics.

Human development indicators are slipping. The United Nations ranked Cuba 97th in its 2025 human development index, down from 57th in 1990. The energy crisis is battering public health and education. Persistent power cuts of up to 22 hours a day in Santiago de Cuba have undermined hospitals and schools. Diplomats note that Cuba produces less than half of the electricity it needs and argue that “the collapse has already happened”.

Outlook: collapse or endurance?
The fall of Nicolás Maduro removes the central pillar of Cuba’s energy system and intensifies the island’s descent into darkness. Without Venezuelan fuel, Cuba faces longer blackouts, deeper economic contraction and heightened social unrest. Yet history cautions against assuming an imminent regime collapse. The Cuban state retains powerful security services, a one‑party political structure and the ability to ration scarce resources. It has weathered decades of sanctions, the collapse of the Soviet Union and previous “special periods” of hardship.

What is different now is the confluence of crises: an energy grid on the brink, an economy mired in recession, a demographic haemorrhage and the pressure of a hostile U.S. administration. Whether these forces will finally overwhelm the Cuban regime remains uncertain. For ordinary Cubans enduring darkness, ration lines and empty shelves, however, the immediate reality is clear: the fall of Maduro has pushed their country towards its most severe crisis in decades.