Berliner Boersenzeitung - Cuba’s bleak oil crisis

EUR -
AED 4.177527
AFN 72.223742
ALL 94.547257
AMD 418.839095
ANG 2.036307
AOA 1043.442074
ARS 1680.137834
AUD 1.644822
AWG 2.047222
AZN 1.931234
BAM 1.961501
BBD 2.29176
BDT 139.953663
BGN 1.923115
BHD 0.42879
BIF 3394.976033
BMD 1.137345
BND 1.47629
BOB 7.862782
BRL 5.909299
BSD 1.137907
BTN 107.359012
BWP 15.526989
BYN 3.23824
BYR 22291.969929
BZD 2.288531
CAD 1.614934
CDF 2580.637098
CHF 0.921375
CLF 0.026542
CLP 1044.58337
CNY 7.723137
CNH 7.73632
COP 3918.530243
CRC 517.905159
CUC 1.137345
CUP 30.139653
CVE 110.749043
CZK 24.26407
DJF 202.128941
DKK 7.474509
DOP 67.046428
DZD 151.753733
EGP 56.31304
ERN 17.060181
ETB 180.440211
FJD 2.57239
FKP 0.864326
GBP 0.861795
GEL 3.002355
GGP 0.864326
GHS 12.766703
GIP 0.864326
GMD 82.458527
GNF 9980.206539
GTQ 8.68123
GYD 238.079825
HKD 8.917664
HNL 30.390087
HRK 7.537412
HTG 148.722223
HUF 354.183579
IDR 20434.571149
ILS 3.392616
IMP 0.864326
INR 107.42318
IQD 1489.92248
IRR 1563906.798376
ISK 143.999143
JEP 0.864326
JMD 179.34121
JOD 0.806397
JPY 184.024737
KES 147.175616
KGS 99.461383
KHR 4560.755034
KMF 493.608245
KPW 1023.611262
KRW 1757.079237
KWD 0.352157
KYD 0.948248
KZT 551.482744
LAK 25095.526127
LBP 101849.281014
LKR 383.4845
LRD 207.281831
LSL 18.868763
LTL 3.358285
LVL 0.687969
LYD 7.284673
MAD 10.708676
MDL 20.197521
MGA 4805.284556
MKD 61.642041
MMK 2387.896327
MNT 4076.044786
MOP 9.189125
MRU 45.573116
MUR 54.830822
MVR 17.572346
MWK 1975.568451
MXN 19.925097
MYR 4.688144
MZN 72.688087
NAD 18.868935
NGN 1564.612203
NIO 41.638593
NOK 11.209337
NPR 171.770431
NZD 2.013335
OMR 0.437312
PAB 1.137897
PEN 3.891992
PGK 4.985269
PHP 69.763066
PKR 316.239064
PLN 4.284272
PYG 6953.146413
QAR 4.145568
RON 5.232701
RSD 117.388821
RUB 86.095889
RWF 1667.348363
SAR 4.270703
SBD 9.157851
SCR 16.72142
SDG 682.407518
SEK 11.070096
SGD 1.474312
SHP 0.849143
SLE 28.196739
SLL 23849.568628
SOS 649.997351
SRD 42.445914
STD 23540.753582
STN 25.021599
SVC 9.956937
SYP 125.713173
SZL 18.868914
THB 37.957194
TJS 10.51958
TMT 3.980709
TND 3.340954
TOP 2.738455
TRY 52.902823
TTD 7.728461
TWD 36.192947
TZS 2978.63486
UAH 51.1657
UGX 4210.235978
USD 1.137345
UYU 45.652678
UZS 13665.205331
VES 706.010555
VND 29934.931047
VUV 136.277564
WST 3.159291
XAF 657.863127
XAG 0.019589
XAU 0.000282
XCD 3.073733
XCG 2.050715
XDR 0.816619
XOF 651.698432
XPF 119.331742
YER 271.399101
ZAR 18.744993
ZMK 10237.478201
ZMW 20.538509
ZWL 366.224756
  • CMSC

    -0.0190

    22.046

    -0.09%

  • RYCEF

    -0.1600

    18

    -0.89%

  • BCC

    2.1000

    79.76

    +2.63%

  • NGG

    0.5900

    83.42

    +0.71%

  • BCE

    0.0000

    23.2

    0%

  • RELX

    -0.2300

    30.92

    -0.74%

  • AZN

    2.6600

    185.68

    +1.43%

  • RBGPF

    0.0000

    61.3

    0%

  • GSK

    0.8000

    51.89

    +1.54%

  • VOD

    0.0500

    13.86

    +0.36%

  • JRI

    0.0100

    12.58

    +0.08%

  • CMSD

    -0.0900

    21.93

    -0.41%

  • RIO

    1.0800

    95.11

    +1.14%

  • BTI

    1.0900

    62.48

    +1.74%

  • BP

    -0.1400

    37.72

    -0.37%


Cuba’s bleak oil crisis




The arrest of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro in early January 2026, and the subsequent pledge by Washington to reroute Venezuela’s oil away from its Caribbean ally, has jolted Havana into a new economic crisis. Cuba’s lifeline to cheap Venezuelan crude has shrivelled; the last tanker from the state oil company PDVSA left Venezuela’s José port in mid‑December and arrived in Havana with its transponder off, carrying about 600,000 barrels. In 2025 Venezuela supplied roughly 26,500 barrels per day, a third of Cuba’s daily needs, while Mexico contributed about 5,000 barrels. After Maduro’s capture, Venezuelan fuel deliveries stopped altogether and U.S. officials declared a virtual blockade on Caracas’ tankers, leaving Cuba with insufficient oil reserves and only modest shipments from Mexico. Energy analyst Jorge Piñón of the University of Texas warned that there is “no light at the end of the tunnel” for Cuba to survive the next few months without Venezuelan oil.

An energy grid in freefall
Cuba’s antiquated, oil‑fired power grid has lurched from crisis to crisis in recent years. A nationwide grid collapse in March 2025 plunged millions into darkness after a transmission line shorted near Havana, forcing a restart of the entire system and leaving both of the island’s main power stations idle. The collapse followed months of rolling blackouts outside the capital that peaked at 20 hours a day, with entire rural areas losing electricity for longer than they had power. Residents resorted to charcoal fires for cooking and scrambled to obtain ice to keep food cold. Cuba’s top electricity official warned that repairs would be slow, while shortages of fuel, medicine, water and food made life “unbearable”.

Blackouts have triggered social unrest. In March 2024, crowds in Santiago de Cuba banged pots and demanded “power and food” when the lights went out at a state‑run market. Residents interviewed by reporters spoke of electricity outages exceeding 10 hours a day. Energy minister Vicente de la O’Levy publicly acknowledged that shortages of power “provide the spark for any protest”. In November 2024, the government warned that it would not tolerate “public disorder” as scattered demonstrations erupted following another nationwide blackout caused by Hurricane Rafael; prosecutors announced the preventive detention of protesters on charges of assault and vandalism. The state responded by distributing emergency rations and accelerating repairs, but rolling blackouts continue across the country.

Blackouts and sanctions squeeze the economy
Cuba’s economy was already contracting before the current crisis. The pandemic and the near‑total shutdown of tourism caused a 10.9% drop in GDP in 2020, according to international statistics. Minor growth in 2021 and 2022 (1.3% and 1.8%) gave way to a return to recession in 2023–24. The United Nations forecasts a 1.5% decline for 2025, leaving Cuba and Haiti as the only Latin American economies still shrinking. Official statistics show that 11 of the country’s 15 economic sectors are contracting: sugar output is down 68%, fishing 53% and agriculture 52%, while manufacturing has fallen 41%. Export earnings fell by $900 million in 2024 and imports were 18% below forecast. Cuban economists estimate that the economy shrank about 4% in 2024, on top of a 1.9% contraction in 2023.

Blackouts amplify these losses. Economists inside Cuba say that the power crisis has paralysed industry and curtailed transport. Households lose refrigeration; water pumps and medical facilities falter; and businesses without generators lose productive hours. In many provinces, blackouts of 20 hours a day have become routine. A human‑rights blog citing utility reports noted generation shortfalls of 1,300 to 1,700 megawatts, meaning that nearly half of national demand went unmet during peak periods.

The collapse of Venezuelan oil supplies will aggravate this deficit. Cuba produces less than half of the electricity it needs and already imports most of its fuel. PDVSA shipments under the long‑standing “oil for doctors” programme once kept Cuba’s thermoelectric plants running; without them, generation capacity is set to plunge. No other ally is stepping in: energy researcher Piñón notes that Angola, Algeria, Brazil and even Russia have not offered significant support. Mexico’s occasional cargoes of 85,000 barrels are insufficient to “keep the lights on across the island”.

Political strain and regime anxiety
The political ramifications are severe. U.S. President Donald Trump has portrayed the seizure of Maduro as part of a broader crackdown on Latin American regimes. During a January 4 press conference, he said that “Cuba looks like it’s ready to fall”, declaring that the island’s government had no income now that Venezuelan oil was cut off. He threatened further military action against Caracas if the remaining officials did not cooperate, and suggested that Colombia and Mexico could also be targets. Trump’s comments have fuelled speculation about regime change, and have unsettled Cuba’s leadership.

U.S. intelligence reports acknowledge the island’s grim economic state but are ambivalent about whether hardship will topple the government. Confidential assessments described key sectors like agriculture and tourism as “severely strained” by frequent blackouts and trade sanctions. Analysts warned that the loss of oil imports from Venezuela could make governing more difficult. One official said that blackouts outside Havana were lasting an average of 20 hours a day. Yet the assessments concluded that economic suffering does not necessarily translate into regime collapse.

Cuban leaders nevertheless display signs of alarm. President Miguel Díaz‑Canel vowed that “nobody tells us what to do” and pledged to defend the homeland “until the last drop of blood”. The prosecutor’s office warned that it would not tolerate disorder during the blackouts and detained protesters for “assault, public disorder and vandalism”. Energy minister Vicente de la O’Levy admitted that power cuts fuel social tensions. Local officials have rushed to deliver subsidised food to calm restive communities in Santiago and other provinces. Behind the scenes, the government is quietly reassigning fuel supplies, rationing diesel for hospitals and planning emergency imports of floating power plants.

A humanitarian and demographic crisis
The economic implosion is driving an unprecedented exodus. Independent demographers estimate that Cuba’s population has fallen 25% in four years, dropping below nine million as hundreds of thousands migrate annually. A U.S. intelligence official cited by the press suggested that the population is likely under nine million. The loss of younger people erodes the labour force and saps the regime’s support base; an emeritus professor, Richard Feinberg, warns that when people are “really hungry,” they focus on survival rather than politics.

Human development indicators are slipping. The United Nations ranked Cuba 97th in its 2025 human development index, down from 57th in 1990. The energy crisis is battering public health and education. Persistent power cuts of up to 22 hours a day in Santiago de Cuba have undermined hospitals and schools. Diplomats note that Cuba produces less than half of the electricity it needs and argue that “the collapse has already happened”.

Outlook: collapse or endurance?
The fall of Nicolás Maduro removes the central pillar of Cuba’s energy system and intensifies the island’s descent into darkness. Without Venezuelan fuel, Cuba faces longer blackouts, deeper economic contraction and heightened social unrest. Yet history cautions against assuming an imminent regime collapse. The Cuban state retains powerful security services, a one‑party political structure and the ability to ration scarce resources. It has weathered decades of sanctions, the collapse of the Soviet Union and previous “special periods” of hardship.

What is different now is the confluence of crises: an energy grid on the brink, an economy mired in recession, a demographic haemorrhage and the pressure of a hostile U.S. administration. Whether these forces will finally overwhelm the Cuban regime remains uncertain. For ordinary Cubans enduring darkness, ration lines and empty shelves, however, the immediate reality is clear: the fall of Maduro has pushed their country towards its most severe crisis in decades.