Berliner Boersenzeitung - Cuba’s bleak oil crisis

EUR -
AED 4.258946
AFN 73.644244
ALL 95.798613
AMD 437.043724
ANG 2.075528
AOA 1063.432933
ARS 1622.920043
AUD 1.620274
AWG 2.087436
AZN 1.975819
BAM 1.950622
BBD 2.337955
BDT 142.182605
BGN 1.910753
BHD 0.437819
BIF 3445.358972
BMD 1.159687
BND 1.476226
BOB 8.020814
BRL 6.028514
BSD 1.160854
BTN 106.577032
BWP 15.512227
BYN 3.409309
BYR 22729.862161
BZD 2.334564
CAD 1.573139
CDF 2522.318599
CHF 0.903286
CLF 0.026191
CLP 1033.814027
CNY 7.975134
CNH 7.971537
COP 4303.71385
CRC 548.159202
CUC 1.159687
CUP 30.731701
CVE 109.974044
CZK 24.386588
DJF 206.706686
DKK 7.473567
DOP 69.686833
DZD 152.476734
EGP 60.270435
ERN 17.395303
ETB 180.058429
FJD 2.547719
FKP 0.861723
GBP 0.863555
GEL 3.154192
GGP 0.861723
GHS 12.524917
GIP 0.861723
GMD 84.657029
GNF 10176.296199
GTQ 8.900452
GYD 242.858522
HKD 9.076522
HNL 30.724243
HRK 7.533097
HTG 152.210581
HUF 387.760437
IDR 19594.068932
ILS 3.605762
IMP 0.861723
INR 106.706788
IQD 1520.676783
IRR 1532758.102435
ISK 145.030416
JEP 0.861723
JMD 182.141255
JOD 0.822219
JPY 183.83584
KES 149.889079
KGS 101.414382
KHR 4658.774825
KMF 490.547711
KPW 1043.757932
KRW 1710.967761
KWD 0.355699
KYD 0.967341
KZT 565.653464
LAK 24866.319001
LBP 103950.02288
LKR 360.826925
LRD 212.419838
LSL 18.893894
LTL 3.424254
LVL 0.701483
LYD 7.410554
MAD 10.824608
MDL 19.977576
MGA 4815.34321
MKD 61.590751
MMK 2434.688632
MNT 4152.733598
MOP 9.353912
MRU 46.07689
MUR 53.240931
MVR 17.928903
MWK 2012.809472
MXN 20.442351
MYR 4.54191
MZN 74.160483
NAD 18.893813
NGN 1621.636342
NIO 42.717903
NOK 11.173391
NPR 170.525785
NZD 1.957818
OMR 0.44588
PAB 1.160834
PEN 4.049551
PGK 5.003848
PHP 68.772327
PKR 324.328623
PLN 4.259037
PYG 7558.133978
QAR 4.233001
RON 5.093927
RSD 117.403854
RUB 92.360375
RWF 1697.039452
SAR 4.35133
SBD 9.337405
SCR 15.958452
SDG 696.971804
SEK 10.670186
SGD 1.476734
SHP 0.870065
SLE 28.533318
SLL 24318.052542
SOS 662.259298
SRD 43.533452
STD 24003.176292
STN 24.435877
SVC 10.157128
SYP 129.016644
SZL 18.899324
THB 36.79334
TJS 11.108706
TMT 4.070501
TND 3.394818
TOP 2.792248
TRY 51.134117
TTD 7.876196
TWD 36.851018
TZS 3009.387547
UAH 50.933226
UGX 4300.640443
USD 1.159687
UYU 46.816542
UZS 14109.609718
VES 505.27161
VND 30441.77968
VUV 138.490957
WST 3.16681
XAF 654.237383
XAG 0.013442
XAU 0.000224
XCD 3.134112
XCG 2.091965
XDR 0.813661
XOF 654.240197
XPF 119.331742
YER 276.70102
ZAR 18.991954
ZMK 10438.571552
ZMW 22.519808
ZWL 373.418691
  • RBGPF

    0.1000

    82.5

    +0.12%

  • CMSC

    0.0300

    23.25

    +0.13%

  • BCC

    -1.9500

    72.54

    -2.69%

  • NGG

    -0.5600

    89.85

    -0.62%

  • BCE

    0.5100

    26.39

    +1.93%

  • CMSD

    -0.0800

    23.08

    -0.35%

  • BTI

    1.0800

    59.41

    +1.82%

  • GSK

    -0.1900

    55.32

    -0.34%

  • RELX

    -0.4900

    35.19

    -1.39%

  • BP

    -0.7100

    39.94

    -1.78%

  • RIO

    1.3300

    91.68

    +1.45%

  • RYCEF

    0.7800

    17.68

    +4.41%

  • JRI

    0.0600

    12.64

    +0.47%

  • VOD

    -0.0200

    14.46

    -0.14%

  • AZN

    0.0400

    194.99

    +0.02%


Cuba’s bleak oil crisis




The arrest of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro in early January 2026, and the subsequent pledge by Washington to reroute Venezuela’s oil away from its Caribbean ally, has jolted Havana into a new economic crisis. Cuba’s lifeline to cheap Venezuelan crude has shrivelled; the last tanker from the state oil company PDVSA left Venezuela’s José port in mid‑December and arrived in Havana with its transponder off, carrying about 600,000 barrels. In 2025 Venezuela supplied roughly 26,500 barrels per day, a third of Cuba’s daily needs, while Mexico contributed about 5,000 barrels. After Maduro’s capture, Venezuelan fuel deliveries stopped altogether and U.S. officials declared a virtual blockade on Caracas’ tankers, leaving Cuba with insufficient oil reserves and only modest shipments from Mexico. Energy analyst Jorge Piñón of the University of Texas warned that there is “no light at the end of the tunnel” for Cuba to survive the next few months without Venezuelan oil.

An energy grid in freefall
Cuba’s antiquated, oil‑fired power grid has lurched from crisis to crisis in recent years. A nationwide grid collapse in March 2025 plunged millions into darkness after a transmission line shorted near Havana, forcing a restart of the entire system and leaving both of the island’s main power stations idle. The collapse followed months of rolling blackouts outside the capital that peaked at 20 hours a day, with entire rural areas losing electricity for longer than they had power. Residents resorted to charcoal fires for cooking and scrambled to obtain ice to keep food cold. Cuba’s top electricity official warned that repairs would be slow, while shortages of fuel, medicine, water and food made life “unbearable”.

Blackouts have triggered social unrest. In March 2024, crowds in Santiago de Cuba banged pots and demanded “power and food” when the lights went out at a state‑run market. Residents interviewed by reporters spoke of electricity outages exceeding 10 hours a day. Energy minister Vicente de la O’Levy publicly acknowledged that shortages of power “provide the spark for any protest”. In November 2024, the government warned that it would not tolerate “public disorder” as scattered demonstrations erupted following another nationwide blackout caused by Hurricane Rafael; prosecutors announced the preventive detention of protesters on charges of assault and vandalism. The state responded by distributing emergency rations and accelerating repairs, but rolling blackouts continue across the country.

Blackouts and sanctions squeeze the economy
Cuba’s economy was already contracting before the current crisis. The pandemic and the near‑total shutdown of tourism caused a 10.9% drop in GDP in 2020, according to international statistics. Minor growth in 2021 and 2022 (1.3% and 1.8%) gave way to a return to recession in 2023–24. The United Nations forecasts a 1.5% decline for 2025, leaving Cuba and Haiti as the only Latin American economies still shrinking. Official statistics show that 11 of the country’s 15 economic sectors are contracting: sugar output is down 68%, fishing 53% and agriculture 52%, while manufacturing has fallen 41%. Export earnings fell by $900 million in 2024 and imports were 18% below forecast. Cuban economists estimate that the economy shrank about 4% in 2024, on top of a 1.9% contraction in 2023.

Blackouts amplify these losses. Economists inside Cuba say that the power crisis has paralysed industry and curtailed transport. Households lose refrigeration; water pumps and medical facilities falter; and businesses without generators lose productive hours. In many provinces, blackouts of 20 hours a day have become routine. A human‑rights blog citing utility reports noted generation shortfalls of 1,300 to 1,700 megawatts, meaning that nearly half of national demand went unmet during peak periods.

The collapse of Venezuelan oil supplies will aggravate this deficit. Cuba produces less than half of the electricity it needs and already imports most of its fuel. PDVSA shipments under the long‑standing “oil for doctors” programme once kept Cuba’s thermoelectric plants running; without them, generation capacity is set to plunge. No other ally is stepping in: energy researcher Piñón notes that Angola, Algeria, Brazil and even Russia have not offered significant support. Mexico’s occasional cargoes of 85,000 barrels are insufficient to “keep the lights on across the island”.

Political strain and regime anxiety
The political ramifications are severe. U.S. President Donald Trump has portrayed the seizure of Maduro as part of a broader crackdown on Latin American regimes. During a January 4 press conference, he said that “Cuba looks like it’s ready to fall”, declaring that the island’s government had no income now that Venezuelan oil was cut off. He threatened further military action against Caracas if the remaining officials did not cooperate, and suggested that Colombia and Mexico could also be targets. Trump’s comments have fuelled speculation about regime change, and have unsettled Cuba’s leadership.

U.S. intelligence reports acknowledge the island’s grim economic state but are ambivalent about whether hardship will topple the government. Confidential assessments described key sectors like agriculture and tourism as “severely strained” by frequent blackouts and trade sanctions. Analysts warned that the loss of oil imports from Venezuela could make governing more difficult. One official said that blackouts outside Havana were lasting an average of 20 hours a day. Yet the assessments concluded that economic suffering does not necessarily translate into regime collapse.

Cuban leaders nevertheless display signs of alarm. President Miguel Díaz‑Canel vowed that “nobody tells us what to do” and pledged to defend the homeland “until the last drop of blood”. The prosecutor’s office warned that it would not tolerate disorder during the blackouts and detained protesters for “assault, public disorder and vandalism”. Energy minister Vicente de la O’Levy admitted that power cuts fuel social tensions. Local officials have rushed to deliver subsidised food to calm restive communities in Santiago and other provinces. Behind the scenes, the government is quietly reassigning fuel supplies, rationing diesel for hospitals and planning emergency imports of floating power plants.

A humanitarian and demographic crisis
The economic implosion is driving an unprecedented exodus. Independent demographers estimate that Cuba’s population has fallen 25% in four years, dropping below nine million as hundreds of thousands migrate annually. A U.S. intelligence official cited by the press suggested that the population is likely under nine million. The loss of younger people erodes the labour force and saps the regime’s support base; an emeritus professor, Richard Feinberg, warns that when people are “really hungry,” they focus on survival rather than politics.

Human development indicators are slipping. The United Nations ranked Cuba 97th in its 2025 human development index, down from 57th in 1990. The energy crisis is battering public health and education. Persistent power cuts of up to 22 hours a day in Santiago de Cuba have undermined hospitals and schools. Diplomats note that Cuba produces less than half of the electricity it needs and argue that “the collapse has already happened”.

Outlook: collapse or endurance?
The fall of Nicolás Maduro removes the central pillar of Cuba’s energy system and intensifies the island’s descent into darkness. Without Venezuelan fuel, Cuba faces longer blackouts, deeper economic contraction and heightened social unrest. Yet history cautions against assuming an imminent regime collapse. The Cuban state retains powerful security services, a one‑party political structure and the ability to ration scarce resources. It has weathered decades of sanctions, the collapse of the Soviet Union and previous “special periods” of hardship.

What is different now is the confluence of crises: an energy grid on the brink, an economy mired in recession, a demographic haemorrhage and the pressure of a hostile U.S. administration. Whether these forces will finally overwhelm the Cuban regime remains uncertain. For ordinary Cubans enduring darkness, ration lines and empty shelves, however, the immediate reality is clear: the fall of Maduro has pushed their country towards its most severe crisis in decades.