Berliner Boersenzeitung - Cuba’s bleak oil crisis

EUR -
AED 4.172342
AFN 72.710612
ALL 94.168298
AMD 416.905528
ANG 2.034081
AOA 1042.371374
ARS 1678.31029
AUD 1.65118
AWG 2.044985
AZN 1.9286
BAM 1.953543
BBD 2.284331
BDT 139.388972
BGN 1.921014
BHD 0.427626
BIF 3379.668848
BMD 1.136103
BND 1.47142
BOB 7.830678
BRL 5.903261
BSD 1.134218
BTN 106.921597
BWP 15.47679
BYN 3.2276
BYR 22267.609445
BZD 2.280951
CAD 1.613709
CDF 2578.952433
CHF 0.920584
CLF 0.026563
CLP 1045.441695
CNY 7.729871
CNH 7.732513
COP 3916.883862
CRC 516.189873
CUC 1.136103
CUP 30.106717
CVE 110.133891
CZK 24.26945
DJF 201.972005
DKK 7.474919
DOP 66.832794
DZD 151.6401
EGP 56.247867
ERN 17.041538
ETB 178.882691
FJD 2.574516
FKP 0.863381
GBP 0.861603
GEL 2.999799
GGP 0.863381
GHS 12.745827
GIP 0.863381
GMD 82.374992
GNF 9937.954521
GTQ 8.645746
GYD 237.107734
HKD 8.909054
HNL 30.348649
HRK 7.534292
HTG 148.234877
HUF 354.840039
IDR 20421.556456
ILS 3.388909
IMP 0.863381
INR 107.521196
IQD 1485.701749
IRR 1562197.774025
ISK 144.001077
JEP 0.863381
JMD 178.747237
JOD 0.805487
JPY 183.755445
KES 147.17041
KGS 99.352152
KHR 4567.301578
KMF 493.068367
KPW 1022.492668
KRW 1758.908246
KWD 0.351795
KYD 0.945119
KZT 549.658668
LAK 25207.846413
LBP 101564.502763
LKR 382.246361
LRD 206.248102
LSL 18.781437
LTL 3.354616
LVL 0.687217
LYD 7.283548
MAD 10.696976
MDL 20.130894
MGA 4835.32959
MKD 61.665491
MMK 2385.286853
MNT 4071.590517
MOP 9.159416
MRU 45.047662
MUR 54.74872
MVR 17.55286
MWK 1966.720578
MXN 19.935202
MYR 4.662111
MZN 72.600692
NAD 18.781437
NGN 1563.41347
NIO 41.733012
NOK 11.244909
NPR 171.205307
NZD 2.016571
OMR 0.436833
PAB 1.133251
PEN 3.887705
PGK 4.976974
PHP 69.678275
PKR 315.645935
PLN 4.286572
PYG 6930.66674
QAR 4.141125
RON 5.233345
RSD 117.38096
RUB 85.43419
RWF 1666.621562
SAR 4.258129
SBD 9.147844
SCR 15.043431
SDG 681.661005
SEK 11.084614
SGD 1.473553
SHP 0.848215
SLE 28.17688
SLL 23823.506013
SOS 648.136161
SRD 42.399316
STD 23515.028438
STN 24.490031
SVC 9.924004
SYP 125.575795
SZL 18.780677
THB 38.010011
TJS 10.476812
TMT 3.976359
TND 3.337298
TOP 2.735463
TRY 52.964947
TTD 7.702898
TWD 36.180204
TZS 2975.379763
UAH 50.999382
UGX 4193.008418
USD 1.136103
UYU 45.466075
UZS 13613.03396
VES 705.239032
VND 29896.537885
VUV 136.128641
WST 3.155838
XAF 655.690086
XAG 0.020225
XAU 0.000285
XCD 3.070373
XCG 2.043977
XDR 0.815518
XOF 655.736242
XPF 119.331742
YER 271.102488
ZAR 18.803803
ZMK 10226.281982
ZMW 20.472108
ZWL 365.824549
  • CMSC

    -0.0190

    22.046

    -0.09%

  • JRI

    0.0100

    12.58

    +0.08%

  • GSK

    0.8000

    51.89

    +1.54%

  • BCE

    0.0000

    23.2

    0%

  • BP

    -0.1400

    37.72

    -0.37%

  • BTI

    1.0900

    62.48

    +1.74%

  • CMSD

    -0.0900

    21.93

    -0.41%

  • NGG

    0.5900

    83.42

    +0.71%

  • BCC

    2.1000

    79.76

    +2.63%

  • RBGPF

    0.0000

    61.3

    0%

  • RIO

    1.0800

    95.11

    +1.14%

  • VOD

    0.0500

    13.86

    +0.36%

  • RYCEF

    0.7000

    18.7

    +3.74%

  • RELX

    -0.2300

    30.92

    -0.74%

  • AZN

    2.6600

    185.68

    +1.43%


Cuba’s bleak oil crisis




The arrest of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro in early January 2026, and the subsequent pledge by Washington to reroute Venezuela’s oil away from its Caribbean ally, has jolted Havana into a new economic crisis. Cuba’s lifeline to cheap Venezuelan crude has shrivelled; the last tanker from the state oil company PDVSA left Venezuela’s José port in mid‑December and arrived in Havana with its transponder off, carrying about 600,000 barrels. In 2025 Venezuela supplied roughly 26,500 barrels per day, a third of Cuba’s daily needs, while Mexico contributed about 5,000 barrels. After Maduro’s capture, Venezuelan fuel deliveries stopped altogether and U.S. officials declared a virtual blockade on Caracas’ tankers, leaving Cuba with insufficient oil reserves and only modest shipments from Mexico. Energy analyst Jorge Piñón of the University of Texas warned that there is “no light at the end of the tunnel” for Cuba to survive the next few months without Venezuelan oil.

An energy grid in freefall
Cuba’s antiquated, oil‑fired power grid has lurched from crisis to crisis in recent years. A nationwide grid collapse in March 2025 plunged millions into darkness after a transmission line shorted near Havana, forcing a restart of the entire system and leaving both of the island’s main power stations idle. The collapse followed months of rolling blackouts outside the capital that peaked at 20 hours a day, with entire rural areas losing electricity for longer than they had power. Residents resorted to charcoal fires for cooking and scrambled to obtain ice to keep food cold. Cuba’s top electricity official warned that repairs would be slow, while shortages of fuel, medicine, water and food made life “unbearable”.

Blackouts have triggered social unrest. In March 2024, crowds in Santiago de Cuba banged pots and demanded “power and food” when the lights went out at a state‑run market. Residents interviewed by reporters spoke of electricity outages exceeding 10 hours a day. Energy minister Vicente de la O’Levy publicly acknowledged that shortages of power “provide the spark for any protest”. In November 2024, the government warned that it would not tolerate “public disorder” as scattered demonstrations erupted following another nationwide blackout caused by Hurricane Rafael; prosecutors announced the preventive detention of protesters on charges of assault and vandalism. The state responded by distributing emergency rations and accelerating repairs, but rolling blackouts continue across the country.

Blackouts and sanctions squeeze the economy
Cuba’s economy was already contracting before the current crisis. The pandemic and the near‑total shutdown of tourism caused a 10.9% drop in GDP in 2020, according to international statistics. Minor growth in 2021 and 2022 (1.3% and 1.8%) gave way to a return to recession in 2023–24. The United Nations forecasts a 1.5% decline for 2025, leaving Cuba and Haiti as the only Latin American economies still shrinking. Official statistics show that 11 of the country’s 15 economic sectors are contracting: sugar output is down 68%, fishing 53% and agriculture 52%, while manufacturing has fallen 41%. Export earnings fell by $900 million in 2024 and imports were 18% below forecast. Cuban economists estimate that the economy shrank about 4% in 2024, on top of a 1.9% contraction in 2023.

Blackouts amplify these losses. Economists inside Cuba say that the power crisis has paralysed industry and curtailed transport. Households lose refrigeration; water pumps and medical facilities falter; and businesses without generators lose productive hours. In many provinces, blackouts of 20 hours a day have become routine. A human‑rights blog citing utility reports noted generation shortfalls of 1,300 to 1,700 megawatts, meaning that nearly half of national demand went unmet during peak periods.

The collapse of Venezuelan oil supplies will aggravate this deficit. Cuba produces less than half of the electricity it needs and already imports most of its fuel. PDVSA shipments under the long‑standing “oil for doctors” programme once kept Cuba’s thermoelectric plants running; without them, generation capacity is set to plunge. No other ally is stepping in: energy researcher Piñón notes that Angola, Algeria, Brazil and even Russia have not offered significant support. Mexico’s occasional cargoes of 85,000 barrels are insufficient to “keep the lights on across the island”.

Political strain and regime anxiety
The political ramifications are severe. U.S. President Donald Trump has portrayed the seizure of Maduro as part of a broader crackdown on Latin American regimes. During a January 4 press conference, he said that “Cuba looks like it’s ready to fall”, declaring that the island’s government had no income now that Venezuelan oil was cut off. He threatened further military action against Caracas if the remaining officials did not cooperate, and suggested that Colombia and Mexico could also be targets. Trump’s comments have fuelled speculation about regime change, and have unsettled Cuba’s leadership.

U.S. intelligence reports acknowledge the island’s grim economic state but are ambivalent about whether hardship will topple the government. Confidential assessments described key sectors like agriculture and tourism as “severely strained” by frequent blackouts and trade sanctions. Analysts warned that the loss of oil imports from Venezuela could make governing more difficult. One official said that blackouts outside Havana were lasting an average of 20 hours a day. Yet the assessments concluded that economic suffering does not necessarily translate into regime collapse.

Cuban leaders nevertheless display signs of alarm. President Miguel Díaz‑Canel vowed that “nobody tells us what to do” and pledged to defend the homeland “until the last drop of blood”. The prosecutor’s office warned that it would not tolerate disorder during the blackouts and detained protesters for “assault, public disorder and vandalism”. Energy minister Vicente de la O’Levy admitted that power cuts fuel social tensions. Local officials have rushed to deliver subsidised food to calm restive communities in Santiago and other provinces. Behind the scenes, the government is quietly reassigning fuel supplies, rationing diesel for hospitals and planning emergency imports of floating power plants.

A humanitarian and demographic crisis
The economic implosion is driving an unprecedented exodus. Independent demographers estimate that Cuba’s population has fallen 25% in four years, dropping below nine million as hundreds of thousands migrate annually. A U.S. intelligence official cited by the press suggested that the population is likely under nine million. The loss of younger people erodes the labour force and saps the regime’s support base; an emeritus professor, Richard Feinberg, warns that when people are “really hungry,” they focus on survival rather than politics.

Human development indicators are slipping. The United Nations ranked Cuba 97th in its 2025 human development index, down from 57th in 1990. The energy crisis is battering public health and education. Persistent power cuts of up to 22 hours a day in Santiago de Cuba have undermined hospitals and schools. Diplomats note that Cuba produces less than half of the electricity it needs and argue that “the collapse has already happened”.

Outlook: collapse or endurance?
The fall of Nicolás Maduro removes the central pillar of Cuba’s energy system and intensifies the island’s descent into darkness. Without Venezuelan fuel, Cuba faces longer blackouts, deeper economic contraction and heightened social unrest. Yet history cautions against assuming an imminent regime collapse. The Cuban state retains powerful security services, a one‑party political structure and the ability to ration scarce resources. It has weathered decades of sanctions, the collapse of the Soviet Union and previous “special periods” of hardship.

What is different now is the confluence of crises: an energy grid on the brink, an economy mired in recession, a demographic haemorrhage and the pressure of a hostile U.S. administration. Whether these forces will finally overwhelm the Cuban regime remains uncertain. For ordinary Cubans enduring darkness, ration lines and empty shelves, however, the immediate reality is clear: the fall of Maduro has pushed their country towards its most severe crisis in decades.