Berliner Boersenzeitung - Cuba's golden Goose dies

EUR -
AED 4.232558
AFN 75.491694
ALL 92.983206
AMD 422.147605
ANG 2.063359
AOA 1056.841746
ARS 1719.990929
AUD 1.635214
AWG 2.074498
AZN 1.955533
BAM 1.955069
BBD 2.322331
BDT 141.996891
BGN 1.95565
BHD 0.434839
BIF 3447.125679
BMD 1.152499
BND 1.475355
BOB 13.599913
BRL 5.974093
BSD 1.153069
BTN 109.86234
BWP 15.522127
BYN 3.443757
BYR 22588.979387
BZD 2.319033
CAD 1.608168
CDF 2621.93481
CHF 0.936722
CLF 0.026775
CLP 1053.787553
CNY 7.77228
CNH 7.774499
COP 3628.228039
CRC 523.806361
CUC 1.152499
CUP 30.541222
CVE 110.221385
CZK 24.217471
DJF 205.333202
DKK 7.475598
DOP 67.325111
DZD 153.076983
EGP 58.028212
ERN 17.287484
ETB 186.51345
FJD 2.553817
FKP 0.853081
GBP 0.855198
GEL 3.008132
GGP 0.853081
GHS 13.202005
GIP 0.853081
GMD 85.284567
GNF 10129.255453
GTQ 8.797824
GYD 241.278711
HKD 9.04297
HNL 30.906575
HRK 7.533764
HTG 150.82686
HUF 363.830078
IDR 20587.607338
ILS 3.441967
IMP 0.853081
INR 109.971392
IQD 1510.528487
IRR 1584253.866897
ISK 141.999215
JEP 0.853081
JMD 182.540935
JOD 0.817136
JPY 183.733108
KES 149.135495
KGS 100.786252
KHR 4669.35488
KMF 493.269137
KPW 1037.248704
KRW 1639.85593
KWD 0.355823
KYD 0.960936
KZT 536.886867
LAK 26016.156704
LBP 103257.524073
LKR 385.43417
LRD 209.280818
LSL 18.631374
LTL 3.40303
LVL 0.697135
LYD 7.354249
MAD 10.710248
MDL 19.988784
MGA 4962.122565
MKD 61.519072
MMK 2420.070328
MNT 4146.655795
MOP 9.319874
MRU 46.087962
MUR 54.34036
MVR 17.817816
MWK 1999.443504
MXN 19.681939
MYR 4.710836
MZN 73.647975
NAD 18.631051
NGN 1569.518888
NIO 42.434313
NOK 10.97757
NPR 175.778019
NZD 1.975026
OMR 0.443152
PAB 1.153069
PEN 3.896909
PGK 5.100115
PHP 70.676995
PKR 320.283262
PLN 4.305269
PYG 6880.426619
QAR 4.203882
RON 5.242487
RSD 117.301519
RUB 96.462057
RWF 1698.457383
SAR 4.343207
SBD 9.294836
SCR 15.810487
SDG 692.089654
SEK 11.022609
SGD 1.475764
SHP 0.853847
SLE 28.293921
SLL 24167.328611
SOS 658.950684
SRD 43.414746
STD 23854.401344
STN 24.490946
SVC 10.089183
SYP 14984.791664
SZL 18.612635
THB 38.19785
TJS 10.665765
TMT 4.033746
TND 3.385778
TOP 2.774941
TRY 55.060866
TTD 7.820041
TWD 37.045897
TZS 3054.119924
UAH 51.522106
UGX 4277.381639
USD 1.152499
UYU 46.41244
UZS 13787.723554
VES 882.10476
VND 30050.257579
VUV 136.680184
WST 3.147219
XAF 655.70891
XAG 0.017897
XAU 0.000263
XCD 3.114686
XCG 2.078114
XDR 0.815491
XOF 655.711754
XPF 119.331742
YER 273.314911
ZAR 18.641902
ZMK 10373.872023
ZMW 21.700884
ZWL 371.104191
  • RBGPF

    0.0000

    72.16

    0%

  • RYCEF

    0.5500

    21.1

    +2.61%

  • CMSC

    0.0100

    21.45

    +0.05%

  • CMSD

    -0.0400

    21.59

    -0.19%

  • JRI

    -0.0200

    12.71

    -0.16%

  • BCC

    -1.2800

    84.25

    -1.52%

  • NGG

    0.4100

    80.68

    +0.51%

  • BCE

    -0.2400

    23.13

    -1.04%

  • RIO

    0.2300

    101.22

    +0.23%

  • GSK

    -0.6000

    50.3

    -1.19%

  • VOD

    0.1900

    16.09

    +1.18%

  • RELX

    -0.8200

    34.55

    -2.37%

  • AZN

    -0.2500

    158.5

    -0.16%

  • BTI

    -0.9700

    55.84

    -1.74%

  • BP

    -0.2300

    42.93

    -0.54%


Cuba's golden Goose dies




On the Malecón, where the sea spray once mingled with the chatter of tourists and the sales patter of street vendors, the silence is now its own weather. A few couples sit watching the waves; fishermen pick at their lines. The classic cars still glint under the sun, but their drivers wait longer for fares, watching empty pavements and scanning for the rare camera-laden passer-by who might pay for a circuit of the city.

Cuba has always marketed itself as an irresistible paradox: an island preserved in time, vivid in colour, heavy with music, history and charm. For years, tourism was not merely an economic sector; it was the country’s great escape hatch — the one dependable way to earn hard currency, to keep people employed, to feed small private ventures, and to cushion the shocks of a system chronically short of cash, fuel and imported goods. It was, in the language of the street, the golden goose.

Now the goose is starving
In the starkest possible symbolism, international airlines were recently told that Cuba would not have aviation fuel to support normal operations, a warning that landed like a thunderclap in the very industry that depends on predictable connectivity. The announcement followed emergency measures that included closing some hotel capacity and moving international tourists to concentrate scarce resources where the state could still guarantee basic services. Those steps were not taken in a vacuum: they arrived against a backdrop of rolling blackouts, fuel queues, water cuts and the visible deterioration of public spaces — all of which have become impossible to disguise from visitors. When a destination cannot keep the lights on, it struggles to keep the planes coming.

A pillar that is cracking
The numbers describe a long slide, not a single bad season. Cuba welcomed roughly 2.2 million international tourists in 2024, a figure far below the island’s pre-pandemic performance and described by officials as falling short of expectations. In January to September 2025, foreign visitor arrivals fell by 20.5%, reaching 1,366,720 tourists, around 350,000 fewer than the year before. By January to November 2025, total arrivals were reported at about 1.6 million — dramatically lower than the 4.8 million visitors recorded in 2018 and the 4.2 million in 2019.

Tourism is not just a statistic in Cuba. It is livelihoods. Street vendors and informal traders depend on footfall; drivers depend on fares; small restaurants, guesthouses and guides depend on a steady rhythm of arrivals. When visitors vanish, the entire ecosystem collapses into survival mode. The result is a cruel feedback loop: lower tourist numbers squeeze incomes, which accelerates emigration, which hollows out the labour force, which weakens service quality, which deters further visitors.

For almost two decades, tourism also provided a vital stream of hard currency — at times estimated at up to $3 billion a year. In a country where imported fuel, spare parts, food staples and medicines compete for scarce foreign exchange, that revenue was more than a “nice to have”. It was structural.

The island that cannot promise basics
Tourists can forgive many things. They can tolerate a slow queue, an old lift, even a little chaos — sometimes that is precisely what they came to experience. What they cannot tolerate is systemic uncertainty: the sense that tomorrow’s basics are not guaranteed.

Cuba’s tourism product is increasingly defined by what it cannot reliably provide. Electricity is the most obvious. Blackouts have become routine, and visitors now arrive with an expectation that the power will fail at some point — in restaurants, in rented apartments, sometimes even in hotels. That changes behaviour immediately. Tourists spend less time outside, avoid certain areas after dark, and become reluctant to plan. Businesses that depend on electricity — refrigeration, air-conditioning, electronic payments, internet access — struggle to operate normally. Hotels can run generators, but fuel scarcity turns that into a gamble rather than a solution.

Water is not far behind. Water cuts do more than inconvenience: they undermine hygiene, discourage dining out, and make accommodation reviews brutal. Add rubbish accumulation in prominent areas and the perception of urban decay, and Cuba’s aesthetic promise — the very thing it sells — begins to crumble in the eyes of those who once considered the island an easy, romantic choice.

Then there is the fuel crisis itself, now overtaking every other constraint. Fuel shortages do not merely darken homes; they immobilise transport, disrupt supply chains, restrict the movement of staff and goods, and fracture the logistical spine of tourism. When fuel scarcity reaches the point that aviation operations are threatened, it does not just deter tourists; it alarms airlines, tour operators and insurance calculations. Connectivity is trust, and trust is the oxygen of travel.

Sanctions, shockwaves and the price of isolation
Cuba’s predicament cannot be explained without the external pressure that constrains its access to finance and trade. Measures imposed by the United States over many years have complicated banking channels, discouraged suppliers, and added significant friction to travel. The island has struggled to attract investment, to import what it needs for refurbishment and maintenance, and to offer the seamless payments experience that modern travellers take for granted.

A decisive moment came years ago when cruise travel — a mass channel of visitors — was curtailed by US policy, sending a chill through the tourism economy and signalling to the wider market that Cuba could again become a politically risky destination at short notice. Since then, additional rounds of restrictions and financial pressure have continued to shape the environment in which Cuba tries to sell itself.

More recently, the tourism collapse has been sharpened by energy geopolitics. Cuba has long depended on external partners for oil and refined products. When shipments from key partners falter — whether from their own crises, from economic limits, or from fear of punitive measures — Cuba’s domestic fragility becomes acute. Scarce fuel is not simply an inconvenience; it is a national choke-point.

The compounded effect is visible in behaviour on the ground. In places once crowded with visitors — seawalls, promenade cafés, tourist buses — workers watch the horizon for customers who do not appear. Drivers slash prices. Vendors carry fewer goods, knowing there is no point making stock that will not sell. Some shift their energy from tourists to the long lines of Cubans seeking visas — a social cue that speaks volumes about what locals think the future holds.

When the state becomes the problem
External pressure matters. But it does not explain everything. Cuba has also been undermining its own tourism engine through policy choices that prioritise control and grand projects over lived reality.

Tourism succeeds when it feels effortless: when there is reliable transport, predictable services, and a private sector able to innovate, respond and fill gaps. Yet Cuba’s tourism model remains heavily centralised, with a dominant state role in planning, investment and revenue capture. That structure can build large resort complexes and manage mass tourism, but it struggles to adapt quickly when the quality of the experience becomes the differentiator — and when the basics of supply, maintenance and staffing require flexible, local solutions.

In recent years, Cuba has continued to push a hotel-building agenda even as demand has softened and even as the broader infrastructure — the electricity grid, water systems, roads, waste management — has visibly frayed. Tourists do not travel for a new lobby if the street outside is dark, the tap is dry and the meal is unreliable. A destination’s “hardware” cannot compensate for the collapse of its “software”.

Meanwhile, small private enterprises — the very businesses that once improved the tourism experience with better food, cleaner rooms and more responsive service — operate under volatile rules and a punishing economic context. Inflation, shortages, and shifting regulations make it harder for them to guarantee quality. The result is an island that feels less hospitable not because its people have changed, but because the system around them is failing.

Tourists notice that contradiction quickly: a warm welcome delivered inside a crumbling machine.

A golden goose with clipped wings
Cuba’s tourism sector is not merely shrinking; it is being reshaped into something narrower and more brittle.
Where tourists once spilled into neighbourhood businesses, spending money in thousands of informal and semi-formal ways, the state now increasingly tries to channel visitors into controllable spaces — large hotels, selected shops, managed transport. That is understandable in a crisis: when fuel is scarce, it is easier to ration it to a few facilities than to keep an entire urban tourism web running. But the tactic also drains the spontaneity and texture that made Cuba distinctive.

Cuba’s allure has never been only beaches and sunshine; the Caribbean offers plenty of that. Cuba’s brand has been authenticity: street music, conversation, architecture, lived history. If tourism is reduced to a tightly managed, energy-rationed, hotel-bound experience, Cuba becomes easier to replace. Tourists can find an all-inclusive package elsewhere — often with better service, better reliability and fewer uncertainties.

That is the core tragedy of the “golden goose” metaphor. The goose is not simply the existence of tourists; it is the ecosystem that tourism sustains — jobs, small enterprises, imported goods, maintenance budgets, local optimism, and even the possibility of gradual reform through contact and commerce. When the state treats tourism primarily as a hard-currency extraction mechanism while failing to reinvest in the foundational systems that make the experience viable, it is not protecting the goose. It is consuming it.

What comes next
Cuba’s leadership has signalled contingency planning: energy-saving measures, consolidation of tourist installations, and efforts to preserve the high season. Those measures may prevent a complete collapse, but they will not, on their own, restore confidence.

Tourism recovery depends on a few unglamorous truths:
- Reliable power and fuel matter more than new hotel rooms. Without them, even the best marketing is irrelevant.

- Basic urban services — water, waste management, public safety — determine whether travellers return and recommend the destination.

- Payments and connectivity must work. In a cashless world, friction becomes deterrence.

- A thriving private sector improves quality faster than central planning can manage, especially in food, hospitality and local experiences.

- Predictability — in rules, in transport, in supplies — is what convinces airlines and tour operators to commit.

For Cuba, each of those truths collides with political realities. Reprioritising spending away from prestige projects towards maintenance is an admission of past errors. Giving greater operational space to private enterprise reduces the state’s direct grip on the tourist economy. Improving payments and connectivity often requires navigating international financial restrictions and rebuilding credibility.

Yet the alternative is visible already: a tourism sector that no longer acts as a stabiliser, but as a mirror of collapse. The golden goose is not dead in the biological sense. Cuba still has what tourists want: beaches, music, history, warmth, beauty. But economically, the goose is already mortally wounded — by blackouts, by fuel scarcity, by decaying services, by disrupted connectivity, and by the strategic choice to prioritise control and construction over the basics that keep a destination alive.

Cuba did not lose its golden goose in one dramatic moment. It has been killing it slowly — not with a knife, but with neglect.