Berliner Boersenzeitung - Who wins and who loses in Syria?

EUR -
AED 4.171961
AFN 79.122198
ALL 98.0054
AMD 436.725149
ANG 2.03286
AOA 1042.173812
ARS 1345.272044
AUD 1.760099
AWG 2.046003
AZN 1.925379
BAM 1.951899
BBD 2.29674
BDT 139.002162
BGN 1.953122
BHD 0.428187
BIF 3386.116903
BMD 1.13588
BND 1.465664
BOB 7.860289
BRL 6.404315
BSD 1.137541
BTN 97.455776
BWP 15.269681
BYN 3.722643
BYR 22263.240097
BZD 2.284923
CAD 1.559369
CDF 3254.295311
CHF 0.936536
CLF 0.027827
CLP 1067.851829
CNY 8.183219
CNH 8.17066
COP 4666.534147
CRC 579.047694
CUC 1.13588
CUP 30.100809
CVE 110.044558
CZK 24.887801
DJF 202.567781
DKK 7.457733
DOP 67.166339
DZD 149.723675
EGP 56.460484
ERN 17.038194
ETB 155.317019
FJD 2.561868
FKP 0.840142
GBP 0.841079
GEL 3.112407
GGP 0.840142
GHS 11.636689
GIP 0.840142
GMD 81.783526
GNF 9859.466437
GTQ 8.736499
GYD 237.98327
HKD 8.912469
HNL 29.63802
HRK 7.530085
HTG 148.911699
HUF 403.859151
IDR 18534.43135
ILS 4.003402
IMP 0.840142
INR 97.674966
IQD 1490.11499
IRR 47848.927731
ISK 144.601162
JEP 0.840142
JMD 181.448916
JOD 0.805389
JPY 163.909131
KES 146.752775
KGS 99.332688
KHR 4561.861642
KMF 493.53615
KPW 1022.252415
KRW 1559.846607
KWD 0.348363
KYD 0.947901
KZT 582.602925
LAK 24568.783613
LBP 101920.831363
LKR 340.517872
LRD 226.935401
LSL 20.373488
LTL 3.353957
LVL 0.687082
LYD 6.192704
MAD 10.460392
MDL 19.564808
MGA 5169.734971
MKD 61.490603
MMK 2384.838862
MNT 4061.482756
MOP 9.192286
MRU 44.965519
MUR 52.057471
MVR 17.560567
MWK 1972.47477
MXN 21.854834
MYR 4.833734
MZN 72.594138
NAD 20.373488
NGN 1799.948587
NIO 41.857073
NOK 11.546909
NPR 155.931696
NZD 1.894857
OMR 0.436754
PAB 1.137526
PEN 4.118468
PGK 4.673679
PHP 63.467843
PKR 321.977581
PLN 4.2749
PYG 9088.952969
QAR 4.147691
RON 5.057056
RSD 117.20706
RUB 89.721925
RWF 1609.497097
SAR 4.260379
SBD 9.485466
SCR 16.411188
SDG 682.097674
SEK 10.931018
SGD 1.467335
SHP 0.892623
SLE 25.806714
SLL 23818.827447
SOS 650.106287
SRD 42.195082
STD 23510.414321
SVC 9.953062
SYP 14768.545432
SZL 20.364564
THB 37.211671
TJS 11.261341
TMT 3.981258
TND 3.386017
TOP 2.660339
TRY 44.461127
TTD 7.718538
TWD 34.096812
TZS 3050.636391
UAH 47.247278
UGX 4142.701307
USD 1.13588
UYU 47.424998
UZS 14599.817793
VES 107.734233
VND 29606.70169
VUV 136.963532
WST 3.123112
XAF 654.654236
XAG 0.033004
XAU 0.000339
XCD 3.069772
XDR 0.814183
XOF 654.657112
XPF 119.331742
YER 276.984376
ZAR 20.307822
ZMK 10224.286233
ZMW 30.541818
ZWL 365.752767
  • RBGPF

    -1.5000

    67.5

    -2.22%

  • RYCEF

    0.1550

    12.035

    +1.29%

  • SCS

    0.3300

    10.52

    +3.14%

  • GSK

    -1.1950

    40.46

    -2.95%

  • VOD

    -0.1000

    10.3

    -0.97%

  • CMSC

    0.0500

    22.12

    +0.23%

  • RIO

    -0.7300

    58.85

    -1.24%

  • BTI

    0.9500

    46.34

    +2.05%

  • NGG

    -0.6000

    71.33

    -0.84%

  • BP

    -0.0050

    29.56

    -0.02%

  • JRI

    0.0440

    12.96

    +0.34%

  • RELX

    -0.5200

    54.06

    -0.96%

  • BCC

    2.5000

    87.6

    +2.85%

  • CMSD

    0.0939

    22.16

    +0.42%

  • BCE

    -0.3400

    21.94

    -1.55%

  • AZN

    -0.1100

    71.82

    -0.15%


Who wins and who loses in Syria?




In a dramatic turning point for Syria, the Assad regime has collapsed, paving the way for Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to seize the reins of power. This profound shift comes after years of civil war, international intervention, and internal political struggles. While the fall of one government and the rise of another might briefly end large-scale hostilities in certain areas, the implications for Syrians—and regional players—are complex and far-reaching. Below, we examine who stands to benefit from HTS’s ascension and who may face serious setbacks in the aftermath.

Potential Winners

1) Hardline Islamist Groups and Affiliates
As HTS consolidates its influence, other aligned Islamist factions may find opportunities to share in governing structures or expand their influence in regions of Syria. Local militias cooperating with HTS may receive political or financial rewards, as well as a certain degree of autonomy in the territories they help control.

2) Foreign Backers of HTS
Certain external supporters might see political or strategic advantages if their preferred groups are now in charge. These backers could influence the formation of new governmental institutions, policies, or trade agreements favorable to their interests.

3) Some Local Communities Under HTS Control
In areas where HTS had already established local governance—providing basic services and a semblance of stability—residents might see a continuation of order, albeit under strict regulations. While personal freedoms may be curbed, some communities might prefer an end to intense fighting over the chaos of ongoing armed conflict.

Potential Losers

4) Moderate Opposition Groups
Non-extremist factions that fought to topple the Assad regime could be sidelined, if not outright suppressed, by the new leadership. Political competition might be stifled, making it difficult for moderate voices to participate in post-conflict governance.

5) Ethnic and Religious Minorities
With HTS widely considered a hardline faction, minority groups—such as Alawites, Christians, Kurds, and Druze—may face persecution or exclusion from the new power structure. Discriminatory policies could lead to displacement, especially in regions already experiencing sectarian tension.

6) Civil Society and Human Rights Advocates
NGOs, independent journalists, and activists critical of HTS’s ideology may be forced to operate clandestinely or face severe repercussions. Freedom of the press, speech, and assembly could be further curtailed, limiting any meaningful civic engagement.

7) International Humanitarian Efforts
Foreign aid agencies may find it more difficult to operate under a leadership that has been labeled “extremist” by many nations. Bureaucratic hurdles, security risks, and ideological disputes may restrict the distribution of crucial humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations.


International Dynamics

Regional Powers:
Neighboring countries that once supported specific rebel factions might find their influence diminished if those groups lose ground under HTS rule. Conversely, regional actors that developed covert ties with HTS might gain a stronger foothold in Syria’s evolving political landscape.

Global Powers:
Western nations could face a dilemma: accept a de facto extremist-led government for the sake of stability, or maintain sanctions and diplomatic isolation. Rivalries between larger international players—such as the United States, Russia, and Iran—may shift as each decides how (or whether) to engage with HTS.

Humanitarian Concerns:
While HTS’s political agenda may bring an end to certain forms of internal conflict, Syria still faces severe humanitarian challenges. Millions are displaced, infrastructure is in ruins, and the economy remains fragile. Aid agencies worry that severely restrictive policies or ideological conditions set by the new authorities could hamper reconstruction and limit aid distribution, prolonging the suffering of ordinary Syrians.
Looking Ahead

The end of the Assad regime and the rise of HTS marks a new chapter in Syria’s ongoing struggle. For some, the new government provides a semblance of order after years of civil war. For others, it heralds tighter social controls, greater risk of persecution, and an uncertain future. How HTS manages governance, minority rights, and international relations will ultimately shape Syria’s recovery or further turmoil.

As the global community watches from afar, Syrians remain on the front lines of this dramatic power shift—some hoping for a break from ceaseless conflict, others bracing for a new and possibly harsher form of authoritarian rule. Only time will tell if HTS can stabilize the country and address the nation’s myriad challenges, or if Syria’s years of turmoil will persist under a different banner.