Berliner Boersenzeitung - Who wins and who loses in Syria?

EUR -
AED 4.232558
AFN 75.491694
ALL 92.983206
AMD 422.147605
ANG 2.063359
AOA 1056.841746
ARS 1719.990929
AUD 1.635214
AWG 2.074498
AZN 1.955533
BAM 1.955069
BBD 2.322331
BDT 141.996891
BGN 1.95565
BHD 0.434839
BIF 3447.125679
BMD 1.152499
BND 1.475355
BOB 13.599913
BRL 5.974093
BSD 1.153069
BTN 109.86234
BWP 15.522127
BYN 3.443757
BYR 22588.979387
BZD 2.319033
CAD 1.608168
CDF 2621.93481
CHF 0.936722
CLF 0.026775
CLP 1053.787553
CNY 7.77228
CNH 7.774499
COP 3628.228039
CRC 523.806361
CUC 1.152499
CUP 30.541222
CVE 110.221385
CZK 24.217471
DJF 205.333202
DKK 7.475598
DOP 67.325111
DZD 153.076983
EGP 58.028212
ERN 17.287484
ETB 186.51345
FJD 2.553817
FKP 0.853081
GBP 0.855198
GEL 3.008132
GGP 0.853081
GHS 13.202005
GIP 0.853081
GMD 85.284567
GNF 10129.255453
GTQ 8.797824
GYD 241.278711
HKD 9.04297
HNL 30.906575
HRK 7.533764
HTG 150.82686
HUF 363.830078
IDR 20587.607338
ILS 3.441967
IMP 0.853081
INR 109.971392
IQD 1510.528487
IRR 1584253.866897
ISK 141.999215
JEP 0.853081
JMD 182.540935
JOD 0.817136
JPY 183.733108
KES 149.135495
KGS 100.786252
KHR 4669.35488
KMF 493.269137
KPW 1037.248704
KRW 1639.85593
KWD 0.355823
KYD 0.960936
KZT 536.886867
LAK 26016.156704
LBP 103257.524073
LKR 385.43417
LRD 209.280818
LSL 18.631374
LTL 3.40303
LVL 0.697135
LYD 7.354249
MAD 10.710248
MDL 19.988784
MGA 4962.122565
MKD 61.519072
MMK 2420.070328
MNT 4146.655795
MOP 9.319874
MRU 46.087962
MUR 54.34036
MVR 17.817816
MWK 1999.443504
MXN 19.681939
MYR 4.710836
MZN 73.647975
NAD 18.631051
NGN 1569.518888
NIO 42.434313
NOK 10.97757
NPR 175.778019
NZD 1.975026
OMR 0.443152
PAB 1.153069
PEN 3.896909
PGK 5.100115
PHP 70.676995
PKR 320.283262
PLN 4.305269
PYG 6880.426619
QAR 4.203882
RON 5.242487
RSD 117.301519
RUB 96.462057
RWF 1698.457383
SAR 4.343207
SBD 9.294836
SCR 15.810487
SDG 692.089654
SEK 11.022609
SGD 1.475764
SHP 0.853847
SLE 28.293921
SLL 24167.328611
SOS 658.950684
SRD 43.414746
STD 23854.401344
STN 24.490946
SVC 10.089183
SYP 14984.791664
SZL 18.612635
THB 38.19785
TJS 10.665765
TMT 4.033746
TND 3.385778
TOP 2.774941
TRY 55.060866
TTD 7.820041
TWD 37.045897
TZS 3054.119924
UAH 51.522106
UGX 4277.381639
USD 1.152499
UYU 46.41244
UZS 13787.723554
VES 882.10476
VND 30050.257579
VUV 136.680184
WST 3.147219
XAF 655.70891
XAG 0.017897
XAU 0.000263
XCD 3.114686
XCG 2.078114
XDR 0.815491
XOF 655.711754
XPF 119.331742
YER 273.314911
ZAR 18.641902
ZMK 10373.872023
ZMW 21.700884
ZWL 371.104191
  • RBGPF

    0.0000

    72.16

    0%

  • RYCEF

    0.5500

    21.1

    +2.61%

  • CMSC

    0.0100

    21.45

    +0.05%

  • CMSD

    -0.0400

    21.59

    -0.19%

  • JRI

    -0.0200

    12.71

    -0.16%

  • BCC

    -1.2800

    84.25

    -1.52%

  • NGG

    0.4100

    80.68

    +0.51%

  • BCE

    -0.2400

    23.13

    -1.04%

  • RIO

    0.2300

    101.22

    +0.23%

  • GSK

    -0.6000

    50.3

    -1.19%

  • VOD

    0.1900

    16.09

    +1.18%

  • RELX

    -0.8200

    34.55

    -2.37%

  • AZN

    -0.2500

    158.5

    -0.16%

  • BTI

    -0.9700

    55.84

    -1.74%

  • BP

    -0.2300

    42.93

    -0.54%


Who wins and who loses in Syria?




In a dramatic turning point for Syria, the Assad regime has collapsed, paving the way for Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to seize the reins of power. This profound shift comes after years of civil war, international intervention, and internal political struggles. While the fall of one government and the rise of another might briefly end large-scale hostilities in certain areas, the implications for Syrians—and regional players—are complex and far-reaching. Below, we examine who stands to benefit from HTS’s ascension and who may face serious setbacks in the aftermath.

Potential Winners

1) Hardline Islamist Groups and Affiliates
As HTS consolidates its influence, other aligned Islamist factions may find opportunities to share in governing structures or expand their influence in regions of Syria. Local militias cooperating with HTS may receive political or financial rewards, as well as a certain degree of autonomy in the territories they help control.

2) Foreign Backers of HTS
Certain external supporters might see political or strategic advantages if their preferred groups are now in charge. These backers could influence the formation of new governmental institutions, policies, or trade agreements favorable to their interests.

3) Some Local Communities Under HTS Control
In areas where HTS had already established local governance—providing basic services and a semblance of stability—residents might see a continuation of order, albeit under strict regulations. While personal freedoms may be curbed, some communities might prefer an end to intense fighting over the chaos of ongoing armed conflict.

Potential Losers

4) Moderate Opposition Groups
Non-extremist factions that fought to topple the Assad regime could be sidelined, if not outright suppressed, by the new leadership. Political competition might be stifled, making it difficult for moderate voices to participate in post-conflict governance.

5) Ethnic and Religious Minorities
With HTS widely considered a hardline faction, minority groups—such as Alawites, Christians, Kurds, and Druze—may face persecution or exclusion from the new power structure. Discriminatory policies could lead to displacement, especially in regions already experiencing sectarian tension.

6) Civil Society and Human Rights Advocates
NGOs, independent journalists, and activists critical of HTS’s ideology may be forced to operate clandestinely or face severe repercussions. Freedom of the press, speech, and assembly could be further curtailed, limiting any meaningful civic engagement.

7) International Humanitarian Efforts
Foreign aid agencies may find it more difficult to operate under a leadership that has been labeled “extremist” by many nations. Bureaucratic hurdles, security risks, and ideological disputes may restrict the distribution of crucial humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations.


International Dynamics

Regional Powers:
Neighboring countries that once supported specific rebel factions might find their influence diminished if those groups lose ground under HTS rule. Conversely, regional actors that developed covert ties with HTS might gain a stronger foothold in Syria’s evolving political landscape.

Global Powers:
Western nations could face a dilemma: accept a de facto extremist-led government for the sake of stability, or maintain sanctions and diplomatic isolation. Rivalries between larger international players—such as the United States, Russia, and Iran—may shift as each decides how (or whether) to engage with HTS.

Humanitarian Concerns:
While HTS’s political agenda may bring an end to certain forms of internal conflict, Syria still faces severe humanitarian challenges. Millions are displaced, infrastructure is in ruins, and the economy remains fragile. Aid agencies worry that severely restrictive policies or ideological conditions set by the new authorities could hamper reconstruction and limit aid distribution, prolonging the suffering of ordinary Syrians.
Looking Ahead

The end of the Assad regime and the rise of HTS marks a new chapter in Syria’s ongoing struggle. For some, the new government provides a semblance of order after years of civil war. For others, it heralds tighter social controls, greater risk of persecution, and an uncertain future. How HTS manages governance, minority rights, and international relations will ultimately shape Syria’s recovery or further turmoil.

As the global community watches from afar, Syrians remain on the front lines of this dramatic power shift—some hoping for a break from ceaseless conflict, others bracing for a new and possibly harsher form of authoritarian rule. Only time will tell if HTS can stabilize the country and address the nation’s myriad challenges, or if Syria’s years of turmoil will persist under a different banner.